Barbara Prainsack

Exploring how data, technology, and solidarity shape our societies


About

I am a professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of Vienna in Austria

I also chair the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), which advises the European Commission

States of Solidarity – Teaching materials

Chapter 1: The power of solidarity

Chapter 1 treats solidarity not as a vague moral ideal but as a social practice – something people do when they support others with whom they perceive a ‘similarity in a relevant respect’ amidst all differences. It traces how the meaning of solidarity has shifted over time and shows why it has become both more important and more fragile in contemporary societies. The chapter also highlights its ambivalent character: solidarity can include, but it can also exclude. By arguing that a strong focus on justice has sidelined the conditions that make solidaristic relations possible, the chapter makes the case that renewing solidarity is essential for sustaining democratic life and responding to today’s major social and political challenges.

Access the chapter here: https://academic.oup.com/book/61834/chapter-abstract/546929900?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Sample discussion questions for a graduate seminar

A. Theoretical foundations

  1. The chapter defines solidarity as a practice grounded in perceived similarity ‘in a relevant respect’.
    • How does this definition navigate between thin (universalist) and thick (exclusionary) accounts of solidarity?
    • What are the normative and political stakes of defining the ‘relevant respect’?
  2. The chapter argues that solidarity is not merely an attitude but part of the social fabric.
    • What analytical advantages does a practice-based understanding offer over attitudinal or institutional definitions? What are its disadvantages?
  3. To what extent is solidarity analytically distinct from adjacent concepts such as altruism, cooperation, or mutual aid?
    • Where do these concepts overlap, and where do they diverge?

B. Theoretical lineages and tensions

  1. How useful is Émile Durkheim’s distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity for understanding contemporary societies characterised by globalisation and digital interdependence?
  2. The chapter highlights divergent traditions in solidarity scholarship (e.g. rational choice vs ethical accounts).
    • Are these approaches reconcilable, or do they reflect fundamentally incompatible ontologies of social action?
  3. How does the chapter position their account of solidarity within (or against) existing traditions in political theory and sociology?

C. Solidarity and justice

7. The chapter argues that the presumed primacy of justice over solidarity in much of academic and public discourse has had unintended consequences.

  • What are the theoretical and political implications of this claim?

8. How should we interpret the idea that solidarity is the ‘reverse side of justice’, as Jürgen Habermas put it?

  • Does this imply complementarity, dependency, or tension between justice and solidarity?

9. Can solidarity serve as an independent normative foundation for political institutions, or must it be anchored in prior principles of justice?

D. Ambivalence and exclusion

  1. The chapter insists that solidarity is not inherently normatively good.
  • How does this complicate its use as a guiding principle for policy and institutional design?
  1. In what ways does solidarity depend on processes of boundary drawing? Is every instance of boundary drawing an instance of a problematic exclusion? If so, why? If not, why not?
  • How can practices of solidarity avoid reproducing problematic forms of exclusion, domination, or epistemic injustice?
  1. How should we evaluate forms of solidarity that are internally cohesive but externally exclusionary (e.g. nationalist or identity-based solidarities)?

E. Solidarity as a political project

  1. The chapter proposes that solidarity can guide the design of institutions and policies.
  • What mechanisms would translate interpersonal or group-level solidarity into durable institutional arrangements?
  1. To what extent can solidarity be institutionalised without being instrumentalised or hollowed out?
  2. The chapter links solidarity to the viability of democratic life.
  • How does solidarity function as a precondition, product, or corrective of democratic governance?

F. Scope and extension of solidarity

  1. The text suggests that solidarity may extend beyond human actors (e.g. to non-human nature).
  • What conceptual commitments are required to make sense of such an extension?
  1. How does the notion of ‘relevant similarity’ operate when solidarity is extended across global inequalities, cultural differences, or species boundaries?

G. Crisis, erosion, and reconstruction

  1. The chapter argues that the conditions for solidarity have eroded in contemporary democracies.
  • Do you agree with this diagnosis? If not, why not?
  • If you agree, what are the key drivers of this erosion, and how convincing is this diagnosis?
  1. How does the chapter’s argument relate to broader debates on neoliberalism, individualisation, and the decline of collective institutions?
  2. Is the proposed turn to solidarity best understood as a corrective, a replacement, or a complement to existing normative frameworks?

H. Application and normative evaluation

  1. Apply the chapter’s conception of solidarity to a contemporary case (e.g. racialised violence, armed conflict, the climate crisis).
  • What insights does it generate that alternative frameworks do not?
  1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of mobilising solidarity as a political concept in pluralistic societies marked by deep disagreement?
  2. Can solidarity be scaled beyond small groups without losing its normative force?

I. Concluding reflection

  1. Does the chapter offer a descriptive or normative account of solidarity – or both?
  • How does this positioning affect its argumentative strength?
  1. What methodological assumptions underpin the chapter’s approach (e.g. conceptual analysis, normative theory, sociological reconstruction)?

Chapter 2: Solidarity and care

Chapter 2 develops the relationship between solidarity and care as complementary foundations for building societies and institutions. I argue that while care is indispensable for responding to concrete needs in specific relationships, it struggles to scale within institutional settings. Solidarity, by contrast, enables the extension and institutionalisation of mutual support beyond dyadic relations. Together, they offer a relational and practice-based framework for designing ‘states of solidarity’, guided by the principles of (1) respect for everyone’s equal dignity and their capacity to contribute, (2) indirect reciprocity, and (3) non-humiliation.

Access the chapter here: https://academic.oup.com/book/61834/chapter-abstract/546930032?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Sample discussion questions for a graduate seminar

A. Conceptual foundations

1. The chapter argues that both solidarity and care are fundamentally relational concepts. What distinguishes this relational view from dominant individualistic frameworks, and what are its implications for political and social theory?

2. How does the chapter differentiate between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ relationality? What normative or institutional consequences follow from adopting one over the other?  

3. In what sense are solidarity and care action-oriented practices rather than abstract principles? How does this shift affect how we derive moral and political norms?  

B. Solidarity, care, and justice

4. Why does the chapter argue that care alone is insufficient as a guide for institutional design? What specific limitations of care can emerge when moving from interpersonal to institutional contexts?  

5. What does solidarity contribute that enables care to be ‘scaled up‘ into broader social and political arrangements?   

6. What does care contribute to solidarity that solidarity cannot do on its own (analytically and normatively)?

C. The design principles of institutions of solidarity

7. The chapter introduces three design principles for institutions of solidarity:

  • respect for everyone’s equal dignity and their capacity to contribute to arrangements of solidarity
  • indirect reciprocity
  • non-humiliation

How do these principles challenge existing models and realities of welfare states or public institutions?

8. What does it mean to organise institutions around the idea that everyone has something to contribute, even if contributions differ in kind and timing?  

9. How does this differ from meritocratic or market-based logics?

10. How does the principle of indirect reciprocity reshape traditional ideas of fairness, obligation, and entitlement?

11. The principle of non-humiliation introduces an affective and relational dimension to institutional design. How might this principle be operationalised in real-world policy contexts?

D. Relationality and social ontology

12. The chapter critiques the view human beings as atomistic individuals. What alternative ontology does it propose, and how does this reshape our understanding of agency and responsibility?

13. How does a relational understanding of persons affect how we think about autonomy and dependency in political theory?

14. To what extent does a relational framework challenge liberal assumptions about choice, responsibility, and obligation?

E. Global and comparative perspectives

15. What can be learned from non-Western or community-based traditions of care and solidarity for designing institutions in contemporary societies?

F. Reflection

16. The chapter suggests that institutions often flatten the relational richness of care. Is this an unavoidable feature of institutionalisation, or can it be mitigated? How?

17. Can there be conflicts between solidarity and care in practice? For example, might solidarity sometimes require actions that are not ‘caring; in a conventional sense? And vice versa?

18. The chapter emphasises that solidarity helps build communities of trust. What conditions are necessary for such trust to emerge, and what role do institutions play in sustaining it?  

G. From theory to practice

  1. How could the ‘design principles’ of institutions of solidarity reshape policy design in areas such as:
  • healthcare
  • social welfare
  • migration
  • climate governance

20. Identify a concrete institution (e.g., a welfare programme, NGO, or international organisation). To what extent does it embody – or fail to embody – the design principles of institutions of solidarity?

Chapter 3: Solidarity in climate governance

Chapter 3 applies the solidarity framework developed in Chapter 2 to the climate crisis. It argues that dominant approaches centred on justice and collective action capture important dimensions of the problem, but remain incomplete. A solidarity-based perspective shifts attention from what we owe to future generations and non-human nature toward questions of mutual support and care. Rather than asking only what duties we owe to distant others, the chapter argues that future generations are more similar to us than different in relevant respects, meaning that we are already bound together in arrangements of mutual dependency. The question then becomes: how do we uphold our side of these solidaristic relationships? A similar argument applies to non-human nature, which is not merely something humans must protect, but something that also sustains and cares for us. This requires rethinking political representation, the boundaries of democratic communities, and the institutions through which climate decisions are made.

Access the full chapter here: https://academic.oup.com/book/61834/chapter-abstract/546930116?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Sample discussion questions for a graduate seminar

A. Conceptual foundations
1. The chapter argues that the climate crisis is not only an environmental or technical problem, but a crisis of political representation. What does this mean? And do you agree?
2. How does a solidarity-based approach differ from justice-based approaches to climate governance? What does solidarity add – and what might it risk obscuring?
3. The chapter shifts the central question from ‘What do we owe future generations?‘ to ‘How are we already connected to them?‘ What difference does this change in framing make for how we organise decision making in a democracy?


B. Representation, democracy, and the boundary problem
4. The chapter uses the All Affected Interests principle as a starting point. What is this principle, and what are its strengths and limitations for thinking about climate governance?
5. Climate change intensifies the classic democratic ‘boundary problem’: who counts as the people whose interests should be represented? How should this question be answered for (a) future generations, and (b) elements of non-human nature, such as mountain ranges, rivers, animals?
6. The chapter argues that future generations should be politically represented despite not being able to vote, appoint representatives, or hold them accountable. How convincing is this argument?
7. What institutional mechanisms might make representation of future generations meaningful rather than merely symbolic?
8. Is democratic legitimacy weakened or strengthened when representation extends beyond currently living citizens?

C. Solidarity beyond the present
9. The chapter argues that solidarity can extend across time. What does solidarity with future generations actually require in practice?
10. How does indirect reciprocity help us think about obligations toward people who do not yet exist?
11. If solidarity is grounded in similarity, what are the relevant similarities between present and future generations? What are the differences?
12. How would the inclusion of future generations in today’s political decision making challenge political systems structured around short electoral cycles and immediate incentives?

D. Non-human nature and political community
13. The chapter argues that some non-human entities – such as certain animals, plants, or even inanimate nature such as mountains – should hold political and possibly legal rights. What is the basis for this claim?
14. Can solidarity meaningfully extend to non-human nature, or does solidarity require human-like agency?
15. How does a solidarity-based perspective differ from stewardship models that portray humans as protectors of passive nature?

E. Climate governance and institutional design
17. What kinds of institutions would climate governance require if designed according to the principles of solidarity rather than efficiency, market optimisation, or national self-interest?
18. How might the three design principles formulated in Chapter 2 – equal dignity and capacity to contribute, indirect reciprocity, and non-humiliation – apply to climate policy?
19. Can current democratic institutions adequately address long-term climate harms, or do we need fundamentally new institutional forms? What would they be?

F. Comparative and global perspectives
20. The chapter references examples such as ombudspersons or commissioners for future generations. What can be learned from these experiments? What worked well, and what did not?
21. What insights might Indigenous or relational ontologies offer for rethinking climate governance?
22. How do colonial histories and global inequalities complicate solidaristic approaches to climate governance?
23. Can solidarity function at a planetary scale, or does it depend on bounded political communities?

G. Reflection
24. Justice-based climate arguments often rely on duty, fairness, or compensation. The chapter argues that solidarity offers a stronger motivational basis because it is grounded in connection rather than obligation alone. Do you agree?
25. Are there tensions between solidarity with current populations facing immediate hardship and solidarity with future generations requiring present sacrifice? If so, how could these tensions be resolved, if at all?

H. From theory to practice
26. Choose a concrete climate policy (e.g. carbon taxation, adaptation funding, fossil fuel phase-out, climate migration governance, biodiversity protection). How would it change if we applied the three design principles of solidarity?
29. Identify an existing climate governance institution (e.g. COP process, national climate council, EU climate governance framework, citizens’ climate assembly). To what extent does it embody – or fail to embody – a solidarity-based approach?

Chapter 4: Work and Economic Democracy

Chapter 4 argues that one of the most significant democratic deficits of contemporary societies lies in the economy itself. While political democracy is widely accepted as a norm, economic decision-making remains largely insulated from democratic control. The chapter explores traditions of economic democracy and asks how solidarity can help reimagine work, ownership, and participation in economic life. Drawing on the three design principles introduced in Chapter 2, it argues that democratising workplaces and broadening the meaning of work are essential steps towards building states of solidarity. Work should not be understood narrowly as paid employment but as all activities through which people contribute to the wellbeing of others and society. Economic institutions should be designed not only to generate wealth but also to respect people’s dignity, recognise their capacity to contribute, and support democratic participation.  

Access the full chapter here:  https://academic.oup.com/book/61834/chapter-abstract/546930202?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Sample discussion questions for a graduate seminar

A. Conceptual foundations
1. The chapter argues that contemporary economies contain a ‘vacuum of democratic control’. What does this mean? Why have economic decisions come to be treated differently from other political decisions?
2. Why does the chapter consider economic democracy an essential component of democratic life rather than an economic issue that should be decided upon by experts?
3. How does the chapter challenge the common assumption that ‘the economy’ is a distinct sphere that should be governed primarily by experts, markets, or technocrats?
4. What does a solidarity-based perspective add to existing debates about economic democracy?


B. Democracy and the economy
5. The chapter suggests that democracy should extend beyond elections and political institutions into economic life. What would it mean to democratise the economy?
6. Are firms and workplaces appropriate sites for democratic governance? Why or why not? 7. How convincing is the argument that workers should have greater ownership and control over economic decision-making?
8. What are the strengths and limitations of workplace democracy as a strategy for addressing economic inequality?
9. Can economic democracy be achieved through reforms within capitalism, or does it require more fundamental transformations?


C. Work, value, and recognition
10. A central argument of the chapter is that dominant understandings of work are too narrow. What counts as work in contemporary societies, and what kinds of contributions are excluded from recognition?  
11. Why are activities such as care work, household labour, community work, and volunteering often undervalued despite being essential to social reproduction?  
12. The chapter argues that recognising unpaid work is not merely a symbolic issue but a political one. What practical consequences follow from how societies define and measure work?
13. How does the chapter challenge distinctions between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ labour? Do you agree, and why (not)?
14. To what extent do current economic indicators such as GDP reinforce narrow understandings of value and contribution?  

D. Solidarity and the design principles for institutions of solidarity (see also Chapter 2)
15. How does the first design principle – respect for everyone’s equal dignity and their capacity to contribute – reshape how we think about work and economic participation?  
16. What would labour market institutions look like if they were organised around the assumption that everyone has something to contribute (Design Principle 1), even if contributions differ in kind, timing, or visibility?
17. How does indirect reciprocity (Design Principle 2) challenge dominant assumptions about contribution, entitlement, and deservingness in economic life?  
18. In what ways can labour market policies, welfare systems, or workplace practices become humiliating? How might the principle of non-humiliation (Design Principle 3) change their design?


E. Universal Basic Income and economic security
19. The chapter discusses Universal Basic Income (UBI) as one possible policy implication of a broader understanding of work. How does UBI relate to the principles of solidarity?
20. Does UBI strengthen or weaken solidarity? How?
21. Could unconditional income support greater democratic participation and freedom, and if so, how? 
22. Might any positive effect of UBI be outweighed by a breakdown of reciprocal obligations? If so, why?
23. How does UBI compare to alternative approaches such as job guarantees, universal basic services, or expanded social insurance?


F. Power, ownership, and participation
24. What can worker cooperatives, employee ownership models, or bicameral governance proposals teach us about economic democracy?  
25. Can democratic workplaces remain competitive in market economies? 
How should conflicts between worker interests, consumer interests, environmental concerns, and profitability be resolved? (Take a look also at Chapter 3 of the book)

G. Economic democracy and broader social change
27. The chapter suggests that transforming work can transform society more broadly. How persuasive is this claim?
28. How does the chapter relate to wider debates on neoliberalism, capitalism, and the commodification of social life?
29. In what ways do current labour markets undermine people’s capacities to care for others and participate in democratic life?
30. Could a more solidaristic economy help address contemporary crises such as democratic backsliding, social fragmentation, or climate change?


H. From theory to practice
31. Choose a contemporary workplace, company, or economic sector. To what extent does it embody – or fail to embody – the principles of solidarity?
32. How would a solidarity-based approach reshape policies concerning:
– labour rights
– platform work and the gig economy
– care work
– taxation
– social security
– corporate governance?
Identify an existing example of economic democracy (e.g. a cooperative, employee-owned company, participatory budgeting initiative, or codetermination system). What lessons can be learned from its successes and failures?


I. Reflection
33. Does the chapter offer a critique of capitalism, a programme of reform, or something else entirely?
34. What tensions emerge between solidarity, democracy, efficiency, and economic growth?
35. Is economic democracy best understood as a matter of justice, care, solidarity – or some combination of all three?
36. What would it mean to build an economy whose primary purpose is not profit maximisation but the support of human flourishing and collective wellbeing?

Chapter 5: Data solidarity in the age of artificial intelligence (AI)

Chapter 5 argues that many current debates on artificial intelligence (AI) ask the wrong questions. Instead of treating AI ethics as a specialised field concerned primarily with algorithmic fairness, transparency, or existential risk, AI should be understood as part of broader political, economic, and institutional transformations driven by datafication. AI is not simply a technological development but a way of organising power, resources, and social relations. Drawing on the three design principles for institutions of solidarity introduced in Chapter 2, the chapter introduces the concept of data solidarity as an alternative framework for governing digital societies. Rather than relying merely on individual consent and privacy, data solidarity proposes strengthening democratic oversight, shared responsibility, and a layered approach to data governance that reflects the different kinds of stakes people have in data. The chapter argues that governing AI well requires redesigning data practices and societal institutions so that they distribute both the benefits and the burdens of datafication more fairly, strengthen democratic control over digital infrastructures, and enable technologies to support rather than undermine human flourishing.

Access the full chapter here: https://academic.oup.com/book/61834/chapter-abstract/546930301?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Sample discussion questions for a graduate seminar

A. Conceptual foundations

  1. The chapter argues that many current debates on AI start with the wrong questions. What should AI ethics and governance be trying to achieve instead?
  2. What does ‘data solidarity’ mean? How does it differ from existing approaches to AI (and data) governance?

B. AI, power, and political economy

  1. How does AI reshape relations of power between citizens, states, and corporations?
  2. The chapter argues that many AI harms originate not from algorithms themselves but from existing social and economic inequalities. Do you agree?
  3. Why have AI ethics guidelines had relatively little practical impact according to the chapter?
  4. Do you agree that dominant narratives about AI distract attention from more immediate political and social problems? Why, or why not?

C. Rethinking data

  1. The chapter argues that current legal categories of personal and non-personal data no longer fit digital societies. Why?
  2. What does it mean to say that data are relational rather than individual?
  3. Do you agree that people’s stakes in data matter more than existing legal definitions of personal data? Why, or why not?
  4. The chapter proposes three layers of stakes in data. How does this layered approach differ from current data protection regimes?
  5. Which kinds of data, if any, should remain under individual control, and which require collective governance?

D. Democracy and digital infrastructures

  1. The chapter argues that digital infrastructures should be understood as political institutions rather than neutral technologies. What follows from this for policy making?
  2. Why does the chapter advocate stronger democratic oversight of digital infrastructures?
  3. What role could data commons play in governing AI and digital societies?
  4. How might treating digital infrastructures as commons change innovation, competition, and public accountability?

E. Solidarity and the design principles for institutions of solidarity (see also Chapter 2)

  1. How does Design Principle 1 (respect for everyone’s equal dignity and their capacity to contribute to society) reshape debates about AI and automation?
  2. What would AI systems look like if they were designed according to the assumption that everyone has valuable contributions to make?
  3. How does Design Principle 2 (indirect reciprocity) challenge dominant business models based on extracting value from users’ data?
  4. In what ways can AI systems or digital services become humiliating? How would the principle of non-humiliation (Design Principle 3) change their design?

F. AI, work, and inequality

  1. The chapter argues that discussions about AI replacing jobs often ask the wrong questions. What questions should we ask instead?
  2. How should societies distribute the productivity gains created by AI?
  3. Can AI reduce inequality, or is it more likely to reinforce existing inequalities? Under what conditions?

G. Regulation, governance, and public institutions

  1. How should responsibility, accountability, and liability for AI harms be distributed among developers, companies, governments, and citizens?
  2. What kinds of institutions would be needed to govern AI according to the principles of solidarity?
  3. Should certain forms of AI be treated as public infrastructure rather than commercial products?

H. From theory to practice

  1. How would a solidarity-based approach reshape policies concerning:
  • generative AI
  • social media platforms
  • health data
  • public-sector AI
  • biometric surveillance
  • autonomous systems?

I. Reflection

  1. Does the chapter primarily offer a critique of AI, a critique of digital capitalism, or a new vision of democratic governance?
  2. What tensions emerge between innovation, efficiency, democracy, and solidarity?
  3. The chapter argues that societies should go beyond individual control-based governance towards democratic governance of digital infrastructures. Is this convincing? Why or why not?
  4. If you had to redesign one AI or data governance institution according to the three design principles of solidarity – equal dignity, indirect reciprocity, and non-humiliation – what would you change, and why?

Chapter 6: States of Solidarity: Democratic statehood in times of crisis

Chapter 6 asks what a ‘good state’ should look like in the twenty-first century. It begins by tracing how dominant twentieth-century Western scholarship defined good states around three goals – national security, societal prosperity, and fairness – with democracy seen as the regime best suited to deliver them. The chapter discusses why most democracies have consistently fallen short of these goals, and argues that the standard explanations for this (globalisation, institutional design flaws, external shocks) capture only part of the problem. What has been overlooked, the chapter posits, is the erosion of states’ capacities for care: their ability to help people support themselves and one another. The chapter identifies three developments driving this erosion: the increasing mismatch between territorial models of citizenship and twenty-first-century patterns of mobility, decades of austerity thinking that has hollowed out public services and infrastructure, and digital transformation and the rise of AI, which has shifted power and public functions toward private tech corporations. Drawing on the three design principles for institutions of solidarity introduced earlier in the book, the chapter closes with a positive vision: states of solidarity – as visions of a ‘good state’ in the 21st century – should be ‘deep’ democracies, should prioritise meeting everyone’s basic needs, should develop new, less territorially bound forms of citizenship, and should actively protect the planet.

Access the full chapter here: https://academic.oup.com/book/61834/chapter-abstract/546930388?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Sample discussion questions for a graduate seminar

A. What makes a ‘good state’?

1. The chapter lists eight features that twentieth-century Western scholarship associated with ‘good states’. Which of these still feel relevant today, and which feel outdated?

2. The chapter identifies three overarching goals behind these features: national security, societal prosperity, and fairness. Are these still the right goals for the twenty-first century, or should others be added?

B. Why have democracies fallen short?

3. The chapter distinguishes ‘liberal’ from ‘electoral’ democracies (following V-Dem). Why does this distinction matter for the book’s argument?

    4. What is the ‘hegemonic view’ of why democracies struggle, and why does the chapter argue it’s incomplete?

    5. Do you agree that many so-called ‘external’ shocks (globalisation, migration, digital disruption) are in fact deeply entangled with ‘internal’ institutional weaknesses, rather than separate from them?

    C. Territorial citizenship

    6. Why does the chapter consider the dominance of territorial citizenship ‘historically anomalous’?

    7. What is the significance of the right to asylum as a ‘super-right’ that transcends territorial citizenship? Do you agree with the chapter’s argument?

    8. What would it mean, practically, to tie entitlements to residency rather than national citizenship?

    9. The chapter proposes portable bundles of civil, political, and social rights across borders. What would be the strongest objections to this model, and how might they be addressed?

    D. Austerity thinking

    10. How does the chapter connect austerity policies to Margaret Thatcher’s claim that ‘there is no such thing as society’?

    11. In what ways, according to the chapter, has austerity shifted states from ‘a bulwark against market intrusion to an arbiter of civic exclusion’? Do you agree with this analysis?

    12. Do you agree that spending cuts on public services are often not cost-effective in the long run? What evidence would you want to see either way?

    E. Digital transformations and AI

    13. How have digital corporations come to perform functions ‘traditionally performed by governments’, according to the chapter?

    14. What does it mean that some tech corporations as having become ‘quasi-regulators’?

    F. States of solidarity: the four features

    15. The chapter proposes four features of a ‘good state’ in the twenty-first century: deep democracy, meeting basic needs, new forms of citizenship, and protecting the planet. Which of these seems hardest to achieve politically, and why?

    16. Before reading the chapter, what would you have considered the core features of a ‘good state’ in our times? Why?

    17. What is ‘deep democracy’, and how does it go beyond free elections and the rule of law?

    18. What is Michael Marmot’s concept of ‘proportional universalism’, and how does it differ from purely means-tested welfare?

    G. Applying the design principles

    19. How do the three design principles for institutions of solidarity (equal dignity, indirect reciprocity, non-humiliation) each show up in the chapter’s vision of a ‘good state’?

    20. The chapter argues that denying rights based on citizenship status violates the principle of indirect reciprocity, even when people actively contribute to society. Do you find this argument convincing? Why, or why not?

    H. Reflection

    21. Is the chapter’s vision of ‘states of solidarity’ realistic given current political trends toward austerity, restrictive citizenship policies, and concentrated tech power – or is it necessarily aspirational?

    22. If you had to pick one of the four features (deep democracy, basic needs, new citizenship, planetary protection) as the most urgent starting point for reform, which would you choose, and why?

    23. How does this chapter’s argument relate to the book’s broader claim (from earlier chapters) that solidarity requires redesigning institutions rather than relying on individual goodwill?